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Abstract: Infrastructure networks such as the Internet backbone 
and power grids are essential for our everyday lives. With the 
prevalence of cyber-attacks on them, measuring the robustness of 
infrastructure networks has become an important issue. To date, 
many robustness metrics have been proposed for this purpose. It 
is desirable for a robustness metric to possess the following three 
properties: considering global network topologies, strictly 
increasing upon link additions, and having a quadratic complexity 
in terms of the number of nodes on sparse networks. Currently, 
most of the metrics satisfying these three properties are based on 
graph spectra. This paper proposes a robustness metric called 
Average Network Flow (ANF), which satisfies these three 
properties, but is not based on graph spectra. Also, an efficient 
algorithm based on Gomory-Hu tree for calculating ANF is 
presented. Finally, this paper compares ANF with eight 
representative existing metrics, showing that each metric has its 
own characteristics in measuring network robustness and hence 
they are not equivalent. Moreover, by focusing our comparisons 
on the scenarios in which network topologies change while 
preserving the same numbers of nodes and links, some specific 
observations on robustness metrics are reported.  
Keywords: Complex Networks, Network Robustness, Network 
Flow, Gomory-Hu Tree  
I. INTRODUCTION 
UR modern world is underpinned by infrastructure 
networks such as the Internet backbone, power grids, 
transportation networks, etc. The robustness of these 
infrastructure networks is of great importance since they have 
become popular targets of cyber-attacks in recent years [1, 2]. 
The popularity of cyber-attacks on them are due to the 
following reasons: (1) security was typically not a major 
concern in the deployment stage, so the hardware and software 
in them may be insecure; (2) the impact of attacking 
infrastructure networks is high; (3) patching the hardware and 
software in infrastructure networks is difficult and slow due to 
the large scale and complexity of these networks.  
Network robustness means the capability of a network to 
withstand failures or attacks [3]. Suitable robustness metrics are 
needed to study network robustness. Many robustness metrics 
have been proposed so far. The most basic metric is the average 
node degree [4] since robustness highly depends on the number 
 
 
of links present on a network. However, the average degree is a 
very rough metric, as it gives little consideration to the network 
topology, by which we mean how links are arranged to connect 
nodes, and we will use ‘network’ / ‘graph’ and ‘topology’ / 
‘structure’ interchangeably in this paper. Overcoming the 
roughness of average node degree, node connectivity and edge 
connectivity [4] appeared to consider the network topology. 
However, their disadvantage is that local network topology is 
considered, resulting in that the node/edge connectivity of a 
small portion of the network can represent the entire network’s 
node/edge connectivity.  
To further improve the granularity of robustness measures, 
metrics considering the global structure of graphs have been 
proposed. Many such metrics are derived from graph spectrum 
[5], which is the set of eigenvalues of a graph’s adjacency 
matrix or Laplacian matrix. It was an interesting discovery that 
the graph spectra from both adjacency matrix and Laplacian 
matrix are closely related to network robustness. Notable 
examples of such metrics include Algebraic Connectivity [6], 
Spectral Radius [7], the Number of Spanning Trees [8], Natural 
Connectivity [9], and Effective Graph Resistance [10]. All 
these five metrics perform well in terms of being sensitive to 
graph structure change. That is, different graphs with the same 
number of nodes and the same number of edges will mostly 
receive a different robustness value under these five metrics. 
Furthermore, the last three of these five metrics satisfy the 
‘strictly increase’ property [11], which means that whenever a 
new edge is added to a graph, the value of the metric will 
increase strictly. Note that the first two of these five metrics 
have been shown not to satisfy this property. This is mainly 
because the first two only involve one eigenvalue from the 
graph spectrum in the metric calculation, while the last three 
involve all eigenvalues from the graph spectrum. The 
sensitivity of these graph-spectrum-based metrics comes at a 
price: the complexity of calculating them on a general graph is 
high, standing at O(n3), where n is the number of nodes in a 
graph. If the graph is sparse, that is, n is in a linear relationship 
with the number of edges, which is true for most infrastructure 
networks, then the complexity can be reduced to O(n2) [12].       
A widely-accepted robustness metric that is not based on 
graph spectrum but considers the global graph structure is the 
so-called R [13]. It was inspired by the Percolation Theory [3], 
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in which the size of the Largest connected Component (LC) in 
a network is a key indicator of how well a network is connected. 
The metric R is obtained by considering the scenario that a 
network is attacked iteratively, and in each round, the node with 
the highest degree and its incident edges are removed from the 
network until all nodes are removed. The R value is then 
calculated by averaging the ratio of the LC size and the network 
size after each round of node removal. Since R considers the LC 
size in each round of node removal, its value is sensitive to 
graph structure change, which is an advantage for a robustness 
metric. However, R fails to increase strictly whenever an edge 
is added to a graph, which is a disadvantage for a robustness 
metric. As to be analyzed in Section III, calculating R has the 
complexity O(nm), where n is the number of nodes, and m is the 
number of edges in a graph. This complexity becomes O(n2) 
when the graph is sparse, so it is on a par with those graph-
spectrum-based metrics in terms of complexity.    
This paper aims to propose a robustness metric that is not 
based on graph spectrum but has the following three desirable 
properties discussed previously: (1) considering the global 
graph structure; (2) increasing strictly when a new edge is 
added; (3) the computational complexity is O(n2) for sparse 
graphs. Our answer to this aim is to use the Average Network 
Flow (ANF) as a robustness metric, where ANF is defined as 
the average of the maximum network flows among all pairs of 
nodes in a network. Firstly, since ANF depends on the network 
flows among all node pairs, it considers the global graph 
structure. Secondly, based on its definition, we prove that ANF 
increases strictly upon edge additions. Thirdly, we propose an 
algorithm for calculating ANF that achieves the complexity of 
O(n2) when the network is sparse and unweighted (i.e., each 
edge in the network has a unit capacity). Our algorithm is based 
on a technique called the Gomory-Hu tree [14], which is to be 
described in Section II.    
Moreover, this paper conduct experiments to compare the 
following eight existing robustness metrics as well as ANF: 
Node Connectivity (NodeC), Critical Fraction (CF) [3], 
Algebraic Connectivity (AC), Spectral Radius (SR), the 
Number of Spanning Trees (NST), Natural Connectivity 
(NatC), Effective Graph Resistance (EGR), and R. The choice 
of these eight metrics is due to their wide adoption in measuring 
network robustness and their possession of clear intuition. We 
briefly discuss these eight metrics in Section III of this paper. 
Our comparisons on these robustness metrics shed light on three 
aspects that have not been adequately examined in the existing 
comparison works, such as [11, 15-17]. These three aspects are 
briefed below. 
Firstly, we study the impact of four important graph 
properties (Degree Variance, Average Shortest Path Length, 
Average Clustering Coefficient, and Assortativity Coefficient) 
[18] on robustness metrics. Here we measure the impact by 
obtaining the Spearman’s correlation coefficient [19] between 
a robustness metric and a graph property.  
Secondly, we study the tendency exhibited by a metric 
towards measuring the robustness under random failures or 
under targeted attacks. Here ‘random failures’ means that nodes 
in a network has equal probability to fail, and ‘targeted attacks’ 
means that important nodes (e.g., nodes with large degrees) are 
removed first. We use the Critical Fraction (CF) as the standard 
metric for measuring the robustness under random failures and 
use R as the standard metric for measuring the robustness under 
targeted attacks, since these two metrics are intended for these 
two scenarios, respectively. We measure this tendency by 
obtaining the Spearman’s correlation coefficient between a 
robustness metric and CF, as well as R.  
Thirdly, we study the performances of three popular graph 
models under those aforementioned nine metrics. These three 
models include Erdos-Renyi (ER) for random networks [20], 
Barabasi-Albert (BA) for scale-free networks [21], and Watts-
Strogatz (WS) for small-world networks [22]. We generate a 
large number of graphs under each graph model, and then 
calculate, on average, which graph model performs better under 
a robustness metric. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces the preliminaries needed by this paper. Section III 
discusses related work and gives the formula for calculating the 
eight existing robustness metrics experimented in this paper. 
Section IV details our algorithm for calculating ANF and 
analyzes its complexity. Section V describes our experimental 
setup and methodology, and Section VI presents our 
experimental results. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
This section introduces the basic concepts needed by this 
paper, including graph spectrum, the four important graph 
properties mentioned in Section I, network flows, and Gomory-
Hu tree.  
A. Graph and Graph Spectrum 
In this paper, a network is modeled by a simple undirected 
graph G=(V, E), where V is the set of vertices (or nodes) labeled 
from 1 to n, and E is the set of links (or edges). We let n = |V|, 
and m = |E|.  
The adjacency matrix of a graph G, denoted by A(G), is a 0-
1 n×n square matrix where its element Aij indicates the 
existence of an edge between vertex i and vertex j, with a value 
1 indicating the existence, and a value 0 the non-existence.  
The Laplacian matrix of a graph G, denoted by L(G), is the 
difference between the degree matrix of G, denoted by D(G), 
and A(G). That is, L(G) = D(G) – A(G). Here D(G) is the 
diagonal matrix containing the degree of each vertex in its 
diagonal. 
The spectrum of a graph G is the set of eigenvalues of A(G) 
or L(G). In this paper, the spectrum of A(G) is denoted by 
{μ1,…, μn}, and the spectrum of L(G) is denoted by {λ1, …, λn}. 
Without loss of generality, we assume μ1 ≤ μ2 … ≤ μn, and λ1 ≤ 
λ2 … ≤ λn. 
B. Four Important Graph Properties 
Degree Variance: is the variance of all node degrees in a 
graph. This property is considered a measure of a graph 
heterogeneity.   
Average Shortest Path Length: is the average of the shortest 
path lengths of all nodes pairs in a graph [18]. This property is 
used to measure the efficiency of information transfer on a 
network.   
Average Clustering Coefficient: is the average of the local 
clustering coefficients of all nodes in a graph [18]. This 
property reflects the clustering level of the entire graph. 
Assortativity Coefficient: is the Pearson correlation 
coefficient of degrees between pairs of linked nodes in a graph 
[18]. This property reflects the general tendency of every pair 
of linked nodes to have similar node degrees in a graph.  
C. Network Flows 
A flow network is a graph G=(V, E) where each edge (u, v) ∈ 
E has a capacity c(u, v) ≥ 0, and there are a source node s and a 
sink node t in V. A flow in a network G is a real-valued 
function  𝑓𝑓:𝑉𝑉 × 𝑉𝑉 → ℝ that satisfies the following two 
constraints:  (1) for any u, v ∈ V,  0 ≤ f (u, v) ≤ c (u, v), which 
is called the Capacity Constraint; and (2) for any u ∈ V – {s, t}, 
∑ 𝑓𝑓(𝑣𝑣,𝑢𝑢) =𝑣𝑣∈𝑉𝑉 ∑ 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)𝑣𝑣∈𝑉𝑉 , which is called the Flow 
Conservation Constraint. Note that this paper will use 
‘capacity’ and ‘weight’ interchangeably due to the legacy in the 
literature. 
The value of a feasible flow from s to t on G, denoted by | f |, 
is defined as: |𝑓𝑓| = ∑ 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠, 𝑣𝑣)𝑣𝑣∈𝑉𝑉 , which means the total flow 
out of source node s. The maximum flow problem is to find the 
maximum | f |. For convenience, this paper denotes the 
maximum | f | between a source s and a sink t in a network G by 
F(G, s, t).  
 Many algorithms have been proposed to calculate F(G, s, t) 
so far. According to the Wikipedia entry [23], the most efficient 
one is Orlin’s algorithm [24], which has the complexity of 
O(nm). If we use Orlin’s algorithm to calculate ANF naively, 
since there are altogether n(n-1)/2 pairs of source and sink in a 
network, the overall complexity becomes O(n3m), which is too 
high. To overcome this problem, this paper resorts to Gomory-
Hu tree [14] to bring down the complexity.  
D. Gomory-Hu Tree 
Given an undirected graph G=(V, E) with edges having non-
negative capacities, a Gomory-Hu tree [14] of G, denoted by T, 
is a weighted tree also taking V as the node set and satisfying 
the following two properties: (1) for any source/sink pair (s, t) ∈ 
V,  if we remove the least weighted edge on the path from s to t 
in T, the s-t cut [25] obtained on the V of T is a minimum s-t cut 
on the V of G; (2) the weight of this least weighted edge equals 
F(G, s, t) on G. Note that it has been proved that a Gomory-Hu 
tree does not always exist on directed graphs [26], so it is 
defined on undirected graphs only. From the properties of the 
Gomory-Hu tree, we see that the maximum flows of all node 
pairs on a graph can be easily obtained if the Gomory-Hu tree 
on this graph is available. 
An interesting result from [14] is that a Gomory-Hu tree can 
be computed with n-1 maximum flow computations, not the 
naïve n(n-1)/2 computations. This means that a Gomory-Hu 
tree can be computed with time complexity O(n2m) if Orlin’s 
algorithm is used. Especially for unweighted graphs, a very 
recent result [27] shows that a Gomory-Hu tree can be 
computed in O(m3/2+o(1)) time. When the graph is sparse as well, 
the complexity becomes O(n3/2+o(1)), which greatly reduces the 
complexity of obtaining the maximum flows among all node 
pairs. Therefore, the basic idea of this paper is to use the 
algorithm from [27] to calculate the Gomory-Hu tree of a 
graph by assuming it is unweighted, and then calculate the ANF 
based on this Gomory-Hu tree. 
III. RELATED WORK 
This section discusses the eight representative robustness 
metrics compared in this paper, and also surveys other 
comparison works existing in the literature.  
A. Eight Existing Robustness Metrics 
We first note that all eight metrics except SR and EGR below 
have a positive relationship with network robustness (i.e., the 
higher the value, the more robust a network is). Thus, for SR 
and EGR, we calculate their reciprocals instead in our 
experiments so as to interpret their results consistently with the 
other six metrics. 
Node Connectivity (NodeC) [4] is the minimum number of 
nodes whose removal disconnects a graph. Note that Edge 
Connectivity is the minimum number of edges whose removal 
disconnects a graph. Since Edge Connectivity is close to and 
highly correlated with Node Connectivity, this paper does not 
include Edge Connectivity in the comparison. 
Critical Fraction (CF) [3] is a robustness metric from 
Percolation Theory, in which the size of the Largest connected 
Component (LC) of a network is a key indicator of how well a 
network is connected [3]. Specifically, CF is defined as the 
fraction of nodes whose random removal makes the LC almost 
disappear (i.e., the ratio of the LC size and the entire network 
size is almost zero). It is discovered that, regardless of the node 
degree distribution in a network, the CF of a network can be 
calculated using the formula below, where 〈𝑘𝑘〉 denotes the 
average node degree and 〈𝑘𝑘2〉 denotes the average of the degree 
square of all nodes. 





Note that this formula holds when n approaches infinite, but 
when n is finite, this formula is still true approximately. Since 
the above formula is obtained by assuming random node 
removals, CF is a metric for measuring network robustness 
under random failures.  
Algebraic Connectivity (AC) [6] is the second smallest 
eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of a graph. That is, it equals 
λ2. Note that λ1 is always zero since the Laplacian matrix of a 
graph is symmetric and positive semidefinite. AC is considered 
a robustness metric because it has the following two properties 
[11]: (1) if λ2=0, the graph is disconnected; if λ2>0, the graph is 
connected; (2) λ2 provides a lower bound for NodeC and edge 
connectivity, i.e., λ2 ≤ NodeC ≤ edge connectivity.  
Spectral Radius (SR) [7] is the largest eigenvalue of the 
adjacency matrix of a graph. That is, SR equals μn. SR is found 
to have an inverse relationship with the epidemic threshold τ, 
which is a critical value below which the epidemic will stop 
spreading on a graph. Specifically, we have SR=1/τ. Thus, the 
higher SR a graph has, the more likely an epidemic can spread 
on this graph, meaning that this graph is less robust in terms of 
preventing an epidemic from spreading. 
The Number of Spanning Trees (NST) [8] is the total number 
of spanning trees in a graph. According to Kirchhoff’s matrix-
tree theorem [28], for a connected graph G, NST is equal to the 








In a network with probabilistic link losses, the probability that 
there exists a path between any pair of nodes is equal to the 
probability of the existence of a spanning tree. Thus, NST is 
used as a robustness metric in many works. 
Natural Connectivity (NatC) [9] is the normalized sum of the 
scaled numbers of closed walks of all lengths in a graph G. It 
happens that NatC can be calculated using the eigenvalues of 
A(G) as follows:   







Since the number of closed walks is a key reflection on the 
number of alternative paths in a graph, NatC has been used in 
several works to measure network robustness.  
Effective Graph Resistance (EGR) [10] is the sum of the 
effective resistances of all pairs of nodes in a graph G, which is 
deemed as an electrical circuit with all edges having a unit 
resistance.  It is proven that EGR can be calculated using the 







Intuitively, the higher the EGR is, the circuit is more in the form 
of series rather than parallel, so the network is less robust. Thus, 
EGR has an inverse relationship with network robustness. 
R [13], similar to CF, is a robustness metric inspired by 
Percolation Theory, but different to CF, R is applied in the 
scenario of targeted attacks. Recall that CF only reflects 
network robustness based on the case of a disappeared LC. That 
is, it ignores the cases in which a network still has some 
connectivity before the LC disappears. To have a fine-grained 
assessment of network robustness, R considers a network being 
attacked iteratively, and in each round, the node with the highest 
degree and its incident edges are removed from the network 
until all nodes are removed. Based on this scenario, R is 
calculated by averaging the ratio of the LC size and the network 
size after each round of node removal. Specifically, given a 










Here, Gi denotes the network after the i-th round of node 
removal, and LC(Gi) denotes the LC size in Gi, and the 1/n at 
the beginning averages the results of all rounds. Due to its fine 
granularity, R has been used in several works such as [29, 30] 
to measure network robustness. 
    Since the time complexity of calculating R has not been given 
in the literature, we analyze it as follows. The computation of R 
involves the following main steps in each round of node 
removal: 
1. Computing the connected components, which takes 
O(n+m) time  [31]. 
2. Finding the LC, which takes O(n) time. 
3. Finding the highest degree node in the LC, which takes 
O(n) time. 
Thus, by combining the total n rounds of node removals, the 
entire complexity of computing R is: 
          O (n (n+m+n+n)) = O(3n2 + nm) = O(nm). 
B. Other Comparison Works 
While many metrics on network robustness have been 
proposed so far, several comparison works [11, 15-17] on 
robustness metrics have also appeared. Here we briefly survey 
these works and also point out our paper’s differences from 
these works. A general difference of our work is that our 
comparison focuses on how the robustness metrics behave on 
different graphs with the same n and m, while the existing works 
are mainly concerned with the behavior of the metrics when m 
changes. 
In [11], a survey on thirteen network robustness metrics 
based on classical graph properties and graph spectra is given. 
This survey presents detailed discussions and comparisons on 
robustness metrics under the following three criteria: the clarity 
of intuition, the ‘strictly increase’ property, and the number of 
redundant paths between a pair of nodes. The experiments are 
only conducted on some baseline graphs, but not on graphs 
under complex network models such as those used in our paper.  
In [15], the focus is on evaluating the metrics on their 
accuracy in measuring network robustness against targeted 
attacks. More than ten robustness metrics are compared, and 
experiments are conducted on ten baseline graphs as well as 
synthetic graphs under Gilbert graphs model, Waxman graphs 
model, and Gabriel graphs model, which are different from the 
models used in this paper. The results shed light on which 
robustness metric is more accurate on a certain graph model. 
In [16], the comparisons focus on the following two aspects 
of robustness metrics: sensitivity in measurement and serving 
as objectives in optimizing network robustness. For sensitivity, 
edges are added or deleted from networks to observe the 
changes of the robustness metrics. For serving as objectives, 
networks are optimized with a metric as the objective, and the 
optimization process uses the Hill Climbing technique [32]; 
then, the optimized networks are evaluated to see how robust 
they are. The experiments are only conducted on the scale-free 
networks (under the Barabasi-Albert model) since the paper 
deems that scale-free networks match real-world networks very 
well. 
In [17], the study of robustness metrics is conducted on 
fifteen real-world telecommunication networks. The main 
results include the following. First, the paper shows the 
relationships between robustness metrics and well-known 
       
graph properties such as Average Shortest Path Length and 
Assortativity Coefficient. Note that, in [17], the relationships 
are discussed simply by observing the curves of metrics and 
properties in the data plots, while our paper shows relationships 
by calculating the Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient. Second, 
the paper shows which robustness metric is relatively high on a 
certain real-world network. Note that our paper also conducted 
a similar study, but we showed which robustness metric is 
relatively high on a certain graph model.   
IV. ALGORITHM FOR AVERAGE NETWORK FLOW 
In this section, we first give the formula for calculating ANF 
and prove that ANF satisfies the ‘strictly increase’ property, and 
then detail our algorithm, and finally prove the time complexity 
of our algorithm is O(n2) on sparse networks.     
A. ANF and ‘Strictly Increase’ Property 
Given an undirected flow network G=(V, E) where each edge 
has a non-negative capacity, the ANF on G, denoted by 
ANF(G), is the average of the maximum network flows among 
all pairs of distinct nodes in G. Given a source node s and a sink 
node t, the maximum flow between s and t is denoted by F(G, 
s, t) as mentioned in Subsection II.C. Since we assume G is 
undirected, we can ignore the order of s and t here. Thus, there 
are altogether 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛−1)
2
 node pairs in G, and then the formula for 




� 𝐶𝐶(𝐸𝐸, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑁𝑁)
(𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡)∈𝑉𝑉×𝑉𝑉,   𝑠𝑠<𝑡𝑡
            (1) 
Note that here we use ‘s < t’ to indicate that we only count a 
node pair once by ignoring the order of nodes, utilizing our 
assumption that nodes are labelled from 1 to n in this paper. 
Now we prove that ANF possesses the ‘strictly increase’ 
property, which is stated in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1.  Suppose an undirected flow network G=(V, E) is 
incomplete, i.e., has some missing edges. If we add any 
absent edge, say (u, v), with a positive capacity c(u,v)>0, to 
G, we obtain a new flow network G’ (𝑉𝑉, 𝐸𝐸 ∪ {(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)}). 
Then, we have ANF(G’)>ANF(G). 
Proof: Since ANF is the average of maximum flows of all node 
pairs, we consider every node pair in ANF(G’) and ANF(G) in 
the proof below. In considering the maximum flow between a 
node pair, we resort to the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem [33], 
which states that the maximum flow between a node pair equals 
the capacity of the minimum cut that separates that node pair. 
Hereafter, we denote the minimum cut for a node pair (s, t) in a 
graph G by MinC(G, s, t), and the capacity of MinC(G, s, t) by 
c(MinC(G, s, t)). Also, refer to Fig. 1 for an exemplar flow 
network where a new edge (u, v) is added. 
First, for a node pair (s, t) that is different from (u, v), we 
show F(G’, s, t) ≥ F(G, s, t). Suppose this is not true, which 
means that c(MinC(G’, s, t)) < c(MinC(G, s, t)). There can be 
the following two cases. 
• MinC(G’, s, t) includes the edge (u, v): Since MinC(G’, s, t) 
separates s and t in G’, MinC(G’, s, t) – {(u, v)} separates s 
and t in G as well, implying that MinC(G’, s, t) – {(u, v)} is 
a cut for s and t in G. However, we have c(MinC(G’, s, t) – 
{(u, v)}) < c(MinC(G’, s, t)) < c(MinC(G, s, t)). This 
contradicts that MinC(G, s, t) is a minimum cut.        
• MinC(G’, s, t) does not include the edge (u, v): Since 
MinC(G’, s, t) separates s and t in G’, it separates s and t in 
G as well, implying that it is a cut for s and t in G. However, 
we have c(MinC(G’, s, t)) < c(MinC(G’, s, t)). This 
contradicts that MinC(G, s, t) is a minimum cut. 
Since both cases above lead to contradictions, we have proved 
that F(G’, s, t) ≥ F(G, s, t). 
Second, for the node pair (u, v) itself, we show that F(G’, u, 
v) = F(G, u, v) + c(u, v) > F(G, u, v). Since MinC(G’, u, v) must 
include the edge (u, v) in it, any MinC(G’, u, v) – {(u, v)} is a 
minimum cut for u and v in G, and any MinC(G, u, v) ∪ {(u, v)} 
is a minimum cut for u and v in G’. Thus, we have F(G’, u, v) 
= F(G, u, v) + c(u, v) > F(G, u, v). 
Now we have shown that for the node pair (u, v), F(G’, u, v) 
> F(G, u, v), and that for a node pair (s, t) other than (u, v),  
F(G’, s, t) ≥ F(G, s, t). Therefore, combining all node pairs 
together, we have ANF(G’) > ANF(G).                                ∎                
B. Algorithm Description  
If we compute the ANF on a graph G using the Formula (1) 
given in the previous subsection, it will involve n(n-1)/2 
computations of F(G, s, t), which is not efficient. Fortunately, 
as mentioned in Subsection II.D of this paper, the Gomory-Hu 
tree of G, denoted by T, has the property that for any source/sink 
pair (s, t) in G, the weight of the least weighted edge on the path 
from s to t in T equals F(G, s, t). Thus, if we have T available, 
we can compute ANF(G) by finding out those least weighted 
edges on the path between all node pairs in T, and using the 
weights of those edges as F(G, s, t). 
As shown in a very recent paper [27], T can be computed in 
an efficient O(m3/2+o(1)) time if each edge in G has a unit 
capacity. To leverage this result in calculating ANF, this paper 
assumes unit capacity on G’s edges. 
Given T, if we find out the least weighted edge on the path 
between each node pair one by one, it requires iterating through 
all n(n-1)/2 node pairs, and for each node pair, an O(n) 
complexity to determine the least weighted edge. This will 
result in an O(n3) complexity, which is not efficient as well. To 
overcome this problem, this paper presents a Depth First Search 
(DFS) based algorithm that can find out the least weighted 
edges from a single source node to all other nodes in O(n) time. 
We call this algorithm the Single Source Least Weight (SSLT) 
algorithm by following the naming convention of the Single 
Source Shortest Path algorithm [33]. With this SSLT algorithm, 
we can use each node in T as the source node and obtain its least 
weighted edges to all other nodes in O(n) time. Thus, we can Fig. 1: An exemplar flow network 
compute the least weighted edges among all node pairs in O(n2) 
time on a Gomory-Hu tree.     
With the above said, we give the pseudocode of our overall 
algorithm for computing ANF in Algorithm 1, which uses the 
SSLT algorithm as a subroutine. The pseudocode of SSLT is 
given in Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 1, we first call the algorithm 
from [27] to compute T. Then, using each node in V as the 
source node, the SSLT algorithm is called to compute the least 
edge weight between this source node and the other nodes. The 
results are saved in a n×n array named flow_array. Finally, the 
maximum flows among all node pairs are summed up and the 
ANF is calculated. 
Algorithm 2 presents the pseudocode of a recursive function 
call SSLT(T, current, parent), which traverses the Gomory-Hu 
tree by DFS and meanwhile computes the least edge weights 
between a single source node and the other nodes. For the 
function parameters, T is the known Gomory-Hu tree of a graph 
with the given source node as the root node, current is the 
current node that the recursive function is visiting, and parent 
is the parent node of the current node in T. Note that, in the step 
4 of Algorithm 1 (the loop using every node as the source node 
s), the SSLT should be called as SSLT(T, s, -1), where ‘-1’ is 
used to indicate that s does not have a parent node, i.e., it serves 
as the root node of T in this iteration. 
    Inside the function body of Algorithm 2, we use T[u] to 
denote the set of node u’s neighbor nodes in T, and use nbr to 
denote a neighbor node in T[u], and use T[u][v] to denote the 
edge (u, v) in T, and use T[u][v].weight to denote the edge 
weight of T[u][v]. The function SSLT(T, current, parent) 
traverses T recursively using DFS and meanwhile find out the 
least edge weights between a source node and the other nodes 
in T. The basic idea is:  
• At any current node during the tree traversal, the least edge 
weight is stored in flow_array[s][current]. 
• For the next node (i.e., nbr) to determine the least edge 
weight, if T[current][nbr].weight is less than 
flow_array[s][current], then flow_array[s][nbr] is set to 
T[current][nbr].weight, otherwise flow_array[s][nbr] is set 
to flow_array[s][current].  
C. Complexity Analysis 
This subsection analyzes the time complexity of our 
algorithm for computing ANF. The result is presented in the 
following theorem.   
Theorem 2.  The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(m3/2+o(1) 
+ n2), which is O(n2) when a network is sparse. 
Proof: In Algorithm 1, the main computations are done in Steps 
3, 4, and 6. Step 3 computes the Gomory-Hu tree by calling the 
algorithm from [27], which has the complexity O(m3/2+o(1)). 
Step 4 calls our SSLT algorithm n times. The SSLT algorithm 
exactly traverses each edge in a Gomory-Hu tree once by 
following DFS. Since m = n – 1 in a tree, SSLT has the 
complexity of O(n). Thus, the entire Step 4 has the complexity 
of O(n2). Step 6 uses two ‘for’ loops to sum up the maximum 
flows among all distinct node pairs, so it has the complexity of 
O(n2). 
Combining the computations in Steps 3, 4, and 6, the 
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(m3/2+o(1) + n2 + n2) = O(m3/2+o(1) 
+ n2).  
We can further discuss this complexity in the following two 
cases. In case 1, when the network is close to a complete graph, 
m is in the order of n2. Thus, the term m3/2+o(1) dominates the 
complexity, and the total complexity becomes O(n3+o(1)). In 
case 2, when the network is sparse, the total complexity 
becomes O(n3/2+o(1) + n2) = O(n2). ∎   
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND METHODOLOGY 
This section describes our experimental settings and 
methodology. Especially, we introduce an algorithm for 
generating a set of graphs with different degree distributions to 
experiment on the general behavior of robustness metrics. 
A. Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient 
In this paper, Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient [19] 
is adopted to show the relationship between two robustness 
metrics or between a robustness metric and a graph property. 
Here a rank correlation coefficient is chosen because we want 
to focus on how robustness metrics rank different graphs. Its 
Algorithm 1: Overall algorithm for computing ANF                       
Input: G=(V, E)          
Output: ANF 
1. Set the capacity of every edge in E to one; 
2. Compute T(G) by calling the algorithm from [27]; 
3. Initialize flow_array[n, n] to store maximum flows  
    among all node pairs;  
4. for s = 1 to n do 
          Call the SSLT Algorithm to compute flow_array[s, x], 
          where x ranges from 1 to n; 
    end for 
5. total_flow = 0; 
6. for s = 1 to n – 1 do 
          for t = s + 1 to n do 
                    total_flow = total_flow + flow_array[s, t]; 
          end for 
    end for  
7. ANF = 2 × total_flow / n / (n – 1) 
Algorithm 2: The SSLT algorithm 
Input: T, current, parent          
Output: Filling in flow_array[n, n] during recursive calls 
 
for nbr in T[current] do  
      if (nbr == parent)   
            continue; 
      end if  
      if (current == s) 
            flow_array[s][nbr] = T[s][nbr].weight; 
      else if (T[current][nbr].weight < flow_array[s][current]) 
                flow_array[s][nbr] = T[current][nbr].weight; 
      else 
                flow_array[s][nbr] = flow_array[s][current] 
      end if 
      // traverse the next node by DFS       
      SSLT(T, nbr, current) 
end for 
value ranges from -1 to 1. If its value is larger than zero, it 
shows a positive correlation; if smaller than zero, a negative 
correlation.   
We typically generate a set of graphs, and then calculate 
robustness metrics and graph properties on this set of graphs, 
and finally obtain the Spearman’s Coefficient between any two 
measures. 
B. Generating Graphs under Three Well-known Graph 
Models 
In our experiments, we use the graphs from the following 
three well-known models for complex networks: Erdos-Renyi 
(ER) for random networks [20], Barabasi-Albert (BA) for scale-
free networks [21], and Watts-Strogatz (WS) for small world 
networks [22]. To provide intuition, exemplar graphs from 
these three models are illustrated in Fig. 2. We generate the 
graphs under these three models by calling APIs from the 
NetworkX [34] library, which is a widely-used Python package 
for analyzing complex networks today. Under each graph 
model, we generated 50 graphs randomly. Then, robustness 
metrics and graph properties are calculated on this set of 50 
graphs. With these values obtained, the Spearman’s Correlation 
Coefficients between metrics or properties are calculated. 
To make our comparisons fair, the graphs under all three 
models are generated with the same n and m. Specifically, we 
use n=200 and m=800 in this paper. The use of the same n and 
m is especially important because we have a set of experiments 
about which graph model performs better on a robustness 
metric. We note that, even under the same n and m, a huge 
number of non-isomorphic graphs still exist. With n=5 and m=5 
as an example, some graphs satisfying this condition are 
illustrated in Fig. 3.  We see that graph structures can still vary 
significantly. Thus, it is meaningful to experiment on how 
robustness metrics behave when n and m remain the same.     
 
Fig. 3: Four non-isomorphic connected graphs with n=5 and m=5 
C. Generating A Set of Graphs with Different Degree 
Distributions 
For the three graph models above, all graphs under the same 
model have a very similar node degree distribution. It is known 
that the degree distribution in ER model is Poisson when the 
number of nodes approaches infinity; the degree distribution in 
BA model follows power law; and the degree distribution in 
WS model can be a little broad, but is heavy-tailed in general. 
Since the degree distributions in these three graph models are 
quite fixed, it is helpful to introduce a set of graphs with 
different degree distributions, so that we can learn the general 
behaviour of robustness metrics.  
For this purpose, we designed an algorithm for generating a 
set of graphs with different degree distributions and also having 
the same n and m. The pseudocode of this algorithm is presented 
in Algorithm 3. Its basic idea is as follows. Given n (needs to 
be even) and m, the average node degree (d) is first calculated, 
and then a degree sequence (degrees[1:n]) is initialized with 
every degree being d. The first graph in the graph set output by 
Algorithm 3 will be a random d-regular graph based on the 
degree sequence stored in degrees[1:n]. Note that, in 
NetworkX, there is a method for generating a graph randomly 
based on a degree sequence, which will be denoted by 
Algorithm  3: Generating a set of graphs with different degree 
distributions 
Input:  
n: the number of nodes (should be even) 
m: the number of edges (2m should be a multiple of n)     
num_graphs: the number of graphs in the set       
Output:  
    graphs[1:num_graphs]: a set of num_graphs graphs 
 
1. Calculate the average node degree: d = 2m/n; 
2. for i = 1 to n do 
          degrees[i] = d; 
end for 
3. graphs[1] = a random graph with degrees as degree sequence; 
4. Calculate the number of degrees to move from left nodes to right 
nodes when generating a graph:  
deg_delta = (m – n/2) / num_graphs; 
5. for i = 2 to num_graphs do 
      for j = 1 to deg_delta do 
            Randomly pick a node l from left nodes; 
            degrees[l] = degrees[l] – 1;  
            Randomly pick a node r from right nodes; 
            degrees[r] = degrees[r] + 1; 
      end for 
      graphs[i]=a random graph with degrees as degree sequence; 
end for  
(a) ER                                                     (b)  BA                                                       (c)  WS 
Fig. 2: Exemplar graphs of  ER, BA, and WS models 
 
rand_seq_graph() later. Then, we divide the nodes into two 
groups: the left group and the right group. The left group 
contains the nodes from 1 to n/2, and the right group contains 
the nodes from n/2+1 to n. Let num_graphs denote the number 
of graphs in this graph set. With num_graphs – 1 steps, we 
move degrees from the left nodes to the right nodes gradually 
to obtain degree sequences with larger and larger Degree 
Variances, thus obtaining different degree distributions among 
the graphs in this graph set. At the end of each step, the 
rand_seq_graph() is called with the current degrees[1:n] to 
generate a graph randomly. The number of degrees to move in 
each step is amortized, such that the last graph in the set will 
see the left nodes all having degree 1 and the right nodes having 
large degrees around 2d, representing a graph with an extremely 
large Degree Variance. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section presents our experimental results on the eight 
existing robustness metrics discussed in Related Work, and 
ANF, the metric proposed by us. As overviewed in Section I, 
our experiments cover three aspects on these nine metrics. 
Below, we detail the results for each aspect with one subsection.   
A. The Impact of Four Important Graph Properties on The 
Nine Robustness Metrics 
Graphs have many properties defined on them. It is natural 
to ask how the increase/decrease of a graph property value will 
affect a robustness metric. In this subsection, we pick four 
important graph properties (Degree Variance, Average Shortest 
Path Length, Average Clustering Coefficient, and Assortativity 
Coefficient) that are relevant for infrastructure networks, and 
show their impacts on robustness metrics. Here the impact is 
measured by the Spearman’s correlation coefficient between a 
graph property and a robustness metric. We present the results 
using four tables, with each table containing the results for one 
graph property. In each table, we present the results under four 
sets of graphs: DD, BA, ER, and WS, where DD denotes the set 
of graphs with different degree distributions, and BA denotes 
the set of graphs under Barabasi-Albert model, and ER denoted 
the set of graphs under Erdos-Renyi model, and WS denotes the 
set of graphs under Watts-Strogatz model.  
TABLE I: CORRELATION RESULTS FOR DEGREE VARIANCE 
 DD BA ER WS 
NodeC -0.8267 -0.3540 -0.3747 -0.3101 
CF 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
AC -0.8291 -0.0970 -0.3562 0.4645 
NatC 0.9999 0.9546 0.9525 -0.2981 
NST -1.0000 -0.8581 -0.8732 -0.0269 
EGR -0.9998 -0.6606 -0.7321 0.3472 
SR -0.9999 -0.9551 -0.9509 -0.8003 
R -0.9963 -0.5613 -0.4842 -0.1134 
ANF -1.0000 -0.7678 -0.9747 -0.9872 
 
Table I gives the Spearman’s coefficients between the 
Degree Variance (DV) and the nine robustness metrics under 
the four sets of graphs. The most obvious observation is that CF 
has a perfectly positive correlation with DV. This is because CF 
fully depends on 〈𝑘𝑘2〉 and 〈𝑘𝑘〉 according to its formula, and so 
does DV (which equals 〈𝑘𝑘2〉 − 〈𝑘𝑘〉2). As aforementioned, all 
graphs generated in our experiments have the same n and m, so 
all graphs have the same 〈𝑘𝑘〉. Thus, 〈𝑘𝑘2〉 will fully decide the 
values of CF and DV according to their formulas, so they are 
perfectly correlated. Intuitively, this can also be explained. As 
discussed in the Related Work section, CF reflects the 
robustness under random failures. When DV is large (typically, 
a small portion of nodes have high degrees and a large portion 
of nodes have low degrees), failure nodes tend to be those nodes 
with low degrees, which explains the robustness of the network. 
Other notable observations from Table I include: 
• Very strong correlations of exactly or nearly ±1 are seen 
under the DD graphs. This is because DD graphs are 
specially generated with significant differences of DV 
among them. These values of exactly or nearly ±1 show that 
DV has a very strong impact on all the nine robustness 
metrics when n and m remain the same. 
• Besides CF, NatC also has a positive correlation with DV in 
general, implying that the increase of DV tends to increase 
NatC. The other seven metrics all have a negative 
correlation with DV under all four sets of graphs, implying 
that the increase of DV tends to decrease these metrics. 
TABLE II: 
CORRELATION RESULTS FOR AVERAGE SHORTEST PATH LENGTH 
 DD BA ER WS 
NodeC -0.7868 0.2340 -0.2577 -0.0010 
CF 0.9655 -0.9489 0.3257 -0.4652 
AC -0.8480 -0.0423 -0.3379 -0.8315 
NatC 0.9659 -0.8633 0.4646 0.9471 
NST -0.9655 0.8415 -0.5003 -0.8066 
EGR -0.9661 0.5956 -0.4999 -0.9564 
SR -0.9659 0.8632 -0.4591 0.2080 
R -0.9594 0.5991 -0.0815 0.0325 
ANF -0.9655 0.7510 -0.3927 0.4335 
 
Table II gives the Spearman’s coefficients between the 
Average Shortest Path Length (ASPL) and the nine robustness 
metrics. From this table, we can mainly observe the following: 
• ASPL also has a strong impact on the nine robustness 
metrics under DD graphs, although its impact is a little 
weaker than DV.  
• For most robustness metrics, the correlations are not 
consistent, with a positive correlation on some graph sets 
and a negative correlation on some other graph sets. This 
shows that there are no definite correlations between ASPL 
and these robustness metrics, and some other graph 










CORRELATION RESULTS FOR AVERAGE CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT 
 DD BA ER WS 
NodeC -0.7959 -0.3065 0.0017 -0.1187 
CF 0.8825 0.8578 0.3907 -0.3862 
AC -0.783 -0.0591 0.0563 -0.7481 
NatC 0.8819 0.7928 0.3436 0.9034 
NST -0.8825 -0.7914 -0.2257 -0.8646 
EGR -0.8838 -0.6467 -0.1346 -0.9579 
SR -0.8819 -0.7946 -0.3142 0.1975 
R -0.878 -0.632 -0.1709 0.0051 
ANF -0.8825 -0.7349 -0.396 0.3605 
 
Table III gives the Spearman’s coefficients between the 
Average Clustering Coefficient (ACC) and the nine robustness 
metrics. From this table, we can mainly observe the following: 
• ACC also shows a strong impact on the nine robustness 
metrics under DD graphs, although its impact is further 
weaker than ASPL. 
• ACC generally exhibits a positive correlation with CF and 
NatC, and a negative correlation with the other seven 
metrics. 
TABLE IV: 
CORRELATION RESULTS FOR ASSORTATIVITY COEFFICIENT 
 DD BA ER WS 
NodeC 0.3321 0.0938 -0.3161 0.1559 
CF -0.539 -0.584 0.1292 0.0294 
AC 0.3497 0.0107 -0.3294 -0.1245 
NatC -0.5359 -0.3887 0.3605 0.2258 
NST 0.539 0.5867 -0.2829 -0.2236 
EGR 0.5387 0.3947 -0.3077 -0.1661 
SR 0.5359 0.3895 -0.3678 -0.4633 
R 0.558 0.6179 0.2011 0. 1486 
ANF 0.539 0.5489 -0.1638 -0.0646 
 
Table IV gives the Spearman’s coefficients between the 
Assortativity Coefficient (AsCo) and the nine robustness 
metrics. From this table, we can mainly observe the following: 
• Unlike the previous three graph properties, AsCo does not 
show a strong impact on the nine metrics under the DD 
graphs, implying that AsCo is not strongly related to 
network robustness in general. 
• AsCo exhibits a consistent correlation with the robustness 
metric R under all four sets of graphs. This conforms with 
the conclusion drawn in an existing work [35] that the 
onion-like structure where nodes tend to connect to nodes 
with similar degrees contributes to a larger R.   
In summary, we can draw the following conclusions from the 
four tables in this subsection: 
• The impacts of the four graph properties on network 
robustness decrease in the following order: DV, ASPL, 
ACC, and AsCo, with DV being the strongest impact factor 
on these robustness metrics. 
• The ANF metric proposed in this paper is consistently and 
negatively correlated with DV under all four sets of graphs, 
implying that ANF tends to be large in networks where 
nodes have similar degrees. On the other hand, ANF is not 
consistently correlated with the other three graph properties.  
• In many cases, the correlations among the four graph 
properties and the nine robustness metrics are not 
consistent, implying that there are many factors affecting 
the values of robustness metrics.  
B. The Tendency of Measuring Robustness under Random 
Failures or Targeted Attacks 
Network robustness has two main scenarios: random failures 
and targeted attacks. It has been shown that a network being 
robust under random failures may not be robust under targeted 
attacks, and vice versa [16].  Two robustness metrics of the nine 
experimented in this paper assume a scenario for being used: 
CF assumes random failures, and R assumes targeted attacks. 
However, the other seven metrics do not need to assume a 
scenario. That is, they can be applied to both scenarios. Thus, it 
is interesting to see the tendencies exhibited by these seven 
metrics toward measuring robustness under random failures, as 
well as under targeted attacks.  
In this subsection, we use CF as the standard metric for 
robustness under random failures, and use R as the standard 
metric for robustness under targeted attacks. We measure the 
tendencies of a metric toward random failures and targeted 
attacks by obtaining this metric’s Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient with CF and R, respectively. The measurements are 
conducted under four sets of graphs: DD, BA, ER, and WS. We 
present the measurement results using one table for each set of 
graphs. In each table, besides the correlations with CF and R, 
we also present the correlation with ANF, as it is the new metric 
proposed in this paper.  
TABLE V: 
CORRELATIONS WITH CF, R AND ANF UNDER DD GRAPHS 
 CF R ANF 
NodeC -0.8267 0.8243 0.8267 
CF 1.0000 -0.9963 -1.0000 
AC -0.8291 0.8208 0.8291 
NatC 0.9999 -0.9960 -0.9999 
NST -1.0000 0.9963 0.9999 
EGR -0.9998 0.9962 0.9998 
SR -0.9999 0.9960 0.9977 
R -0.9963 1.0000 0.9963 
ANF -1.0000 0.9963 1.0000 
 
Table V gives the nine metrics’ correlation results with CF, 
R, and ANF respectively under the DD graphs. An important 
observation from this table is the following: if a metric is 
positively correlated with CF, then it is negatively correlated 
with R, and vice versa. This shows that, in general, when a 
graph is robust under random failures, it is fragile under 
targeted attacks, and vice versa. This can be explained as 
follows. When the nodes in a graph are similar (e.g., in terms of 
node degrees), it is difficult to carry out targeted attacks since 
no nodes have significant importance. Thus, the graph is robust 
against targeted attacks. On the other hand, when the nodes in 
a graph have a large degree variance, then typically a small 
portion of nodes will have very large degrees and the majority 
of nodes will have small degrees. This will make random 
failures mostly occur at those nodes with small degrees, so the 
graph is robust against random failures.    
Other notable observations from Table V include: 
• Only NatC strongly and positively correlate with CF, 
showing that it reflects more on the robustness under 
random failures. 
• NodeC, AC, NST, EGR, SR, and ANF all strongly and 
positively correlate with R, showing that they reflect more 
on the robustness against targeted attacks. 
• NST, EGR, SR, and R all strongly correlate with ANF, 
showing that these four metrics work similarly to ANF 
under the DD graphs. 
    Table VI gives the nine metrics’ correlation results with CF, 
R, and ANF respectively under the BA graphs. From this table, 
we can see that all phenomena observed from Table V remain 
true in the sense of positiveness or negativeness of correlations, 
and the only differences are that the coefficient values become 
smaller. 
TABLE VI: 
CORRELATIONS WITH CF, R AND ANF UNDER BA GRAPHS 
 CF R ANF 
NodeC -0.3540 0.2371 0.5396 
CF 1.0000 -0.5613 -0.7678 
AC -0.0970 0.0005 0.1226 
NatC 0.9546 -0.4770 -0.7394 
NST -0.8581 0.7746 0.9710 
EGR -0.6606 0.7009 0.9542 
SR -0.9551 0.4776 0.7419 
R -0.5613 1.0000 0.7770 
ANF -0.7678 0.7770 1.0000 
 
TABLE VII: 
CORRELATIONS WITH CF, R AND ANF UNDER ER GRAPHS 
 CF R ANF 
NodeC -0.3747 0.1213 0.4092 
CF 1.0000 -0.4842 -0.9747 
AC -0.3562 0.1326 0.4080 
NatC 0.9525 -0.3881 -0.9398 
NST -0.8732 0.4248 0.8976 
EGR -0.7321 0.3502 0.7612 
SR -0.9509 0.4072 0.9328 
R -0.4842 1.0000 0.4570 
ANF -0.9747 0.4570 1.0000 
 
Table VII gives the nine metrics’ correlation results with CF, 
R, and ANF respectively under the ER graphs. Similar to Table 
VI, this table also shows that all phenomena observed from 
Table V remain true in the sense of positiveness or negativeness 
of correlations, and the only differences from Table V are that 







CORRELATIONS WITH CF, R AND ANF UNDER WS GRAPHS 
 CF R ANF 
NodeC -0.3101 0.2203 0.2785 
CF 1.0000 -0.1134 -0.9872 
AC 0.4645 -0.0805 -0.4609 
NatC -0.2981 -0.0609 0.2595 
NST -0.0269 0.0563 0.0573 
EGR 0.3472 -0.0083 -0.3154 
SR -0.8003 0.1597 0.3962 
R -0.1134 1.0000 0.1049 
ANF -0.9872 0.1049 1.0000 
 
Table VIII gives the nine metrics’ correlation results with 
CF, R, and ANF respectively under the WS graphs. This table 
basically agrees with the previous three tables that a metric 
shows opposite correlation signs with CF and R, except that 
NatC negatively correlates with both CF and R in this table, 
though weakly. Another difference from the previous three 
tables is that NST, EGR, SR, and R no longer strongly correlate 
with ANF. 
In summary, we can draw the following conclusions from the 
four tables in this subsection: 
• Based on their tendencies, we can divide the nine metrics 
into three categories: CF and NatC for random failures; 
ANF, NST, EGR, SR, and R for targeted attacks; and 
NodeC and AC weakly for targeted attacks.  
• Although the metrics NST, EGR, SR, and R strongly 
correlate with ANF in the first three tables, they do not in 
the fourth table. This shows that ANF is not equivalent to 
these four metrics. 
• It is amazing to see that CF has strong correlations (either 
positive or negative) with NatC, NST, EGR, SR, R, and 
ANF. This reflects that the reciprocal of CF can actually be 
used to measure network robustness under targeted attacks. 
However, CF is not sensitive to network structure change. 
For instance, a network of a cycle of six nodes will receive 
the same CF value as another network of two cycles of three 
nodes, but the latter should be less robust as it is 
disconnected.  
C. Performance of Graph Models under Nine Robustness 
Metrics and Four Graph Properties 
In this subsection, we first experiment on how the three 
popular graph models (BA, ER, and WS) perform on the nine 
robustness metrics, revealing which graph model performs the 
best given a robustness metric. Then, we experiment on how the 
three graph models perform on the four important graph 
properties, which helps interpreting the experimental results on 
robustness metrics. Note that we did not include the set of DD 
graphs in the experiments for this subsection, since the set of 
DD graphs includes graphs with different kinds of degree 





AVERAGE VALUES OF ROBUSTNESS METRICS ON THREE GRAPH MODELS 
 BA ER WS 
NodeC 3.5200 1.6400 4.9200 
CF 0.9212 0.8740 0.8608 
AC 2.0144 1.2659 0.9462 
NatC 7.9228 4.0302 4.2772 
NST 3.02E+156 5.31E+166 2.18E+168 
EGR 0.00013 0.00015 0.00015 
SR 0.07575 0.11075 0.12158 
R 0.25573 0.35358 0.38058 
ANF 5.24582 6.46080 7.34037 
 
Table IX gives the average values of the nine robustness 
metrics on three graph models. Specifically, for each graph 
model, the average value of a metric on 50 randomly-generated 
graphs is presented in this table. As discussed in Section III, for 
EGR and SR, the reciprocals of their values are presented in this 
table, since the original values of these two metrics increase 
when the network robustness decreases. From this table, we can 
mainly see that: 
• For the metrics NodeC, NST, EGR, SR, R and ANF, the WS 
graphs perform the best. 
• For the metrics CF, AC, and NatC, the BA graphs perform 
the best. 
    Below we will explain the phenomena seen in this table using 
what is observed about DV in Table X.  
TABLE X: 
AVERAGE VALUES OF GRAPH PROPERTIES ON THREE GRAPH MODELS 
 BA ER WS 
Degree Variance  
(DV) 45.7636 7.5092 1.4590 
Avg Shortest Path Length 
(ASPL) 2.6118 2.7660 3.2135 
Avg Clustering Coefficient 
(ACC) 0.1092 0.0403 0.3441 
Assortativity Coefficient 
(AsCo) -0.1044 -0.0152 -0.0210 
 
    Table X gives the average values of the four graph properties 
on three graph models. Similar to the way of obtaining Table 
IX, this table presents the average value of a property on 50 
randomly-generated graphs of a graph model. From this table, 
we can mainly see that: 
• DV exhibits the highest value on BA graphs, and the lowest 
value in WS graphs. This explains why WS graphs see 
higher values on the metrics NST, EGR, SR, R and ANF 
which favor graphs with small DVs, and why BA graphs see 
higher values on the metrics CF and NatC which favor 
graphs with large DVs.   
• ASPL exhibits slightly higher value on WS graphs than on 
BA and ER graphs, although the WS model is for small-
world graphs. This is because BA graphs and ER graphs 
also satisfy the small-world feature which means that the 
ASPL of a graph has a logarithmic relationship with n. As 
mentioned in its original work [22], the characteristic of WS 
model is that the graphs in it satisfy both the small-world 
feature and the high clustering coefficient feature, which is 
evident from the ACC row of this table. BA graphs and ER 
graphs have more hub nodes (the nodes with large degrees) 
than WS graphs, which gives rise to the smaller ASPL in 
these two graph models.  
• ACC exhibits the highest value on WS graphs, which is 
explained in the point above. 
• AsCo exhibits a value around zero for all three graph 
models, showing that the graphs in all three models are not 
very assortative. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposed ANF as a metric for network robustness, 
and demonstrated that it has the following three advantages. 
First, since ANF considers network flows among all pairs of 
nodes in a network, it is sensitive to network structure change. 
Second, we have proved that ANF satisfies the ‘Strictly 
Increase’ property. Finally, we have given an O(n2) algorithm 
for computing ANF by exploiting the Gomory-Hu tree on a 
network.   
This paper also compared ANF with other eight 
representative robustness metrics. Different from existing 
comparison works, our comparisons focus on the scenarios 
where graph structures change while preserving the same n and 
m. This focus allows us to reveal phenomena not reported 
before. Important such phenomena include: 
• The graph property DV impacts network robustness much 
stronger than the other three graph properties experimented 
in this paper: ASPL, ACC, and AsCo. 
• The metric NatC strongly aligns with CF for measuring 
network robustness under random failures; and the metrics 
ANF, NST, EGR, and SR strongly align with R for 
measuring network robustness under targeted attacks; and 
the metrics NodeC and AC weakly align with R for 
measuring network robustness under targeted attacks. 
    In general, we see different robustness metrics show different 
aspects of network robustness, so it is recommended to apply 
multiple robustness metrics on a network to gain a 
comprehensive view of its robustness. ANF, per se, strongly 
reflects network robustness under targeted attacks, and also 
embodies the network capability for carrying traffic since it is 
based on network flows.   
    For the future work, we will make endeavors in the following 
two directions. First, we currently enumerate the network flows 
among all node pairs and then calculate the ANF by summing 
them together. An obvious idea is to explore whether the sum 
can be calculated without enumerating all-pairs network flows. 
Although this idea is obvious and intriguing, such an algorithm 
has not been discovered in the literature yet. Second, we 
currently assume the unit capacity on network links to achieve 
the O(n2) complexity of calculating ANF. It will be significant 
to design an algorithm that achieves the same complexity on 
arbitrary link capacities. At least, no researchers have proved 
that this is impossible yet.  
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